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Abstract
We investigate the dynamic eﬀects of interregional labor market integration
on migration flows, capital formation, and the price for housing services. The
co-evolution of these variables depends on initial conditions at the time of labor
market integration. In an initially capital-poor economy, there may be a reversal
of migration flows during the transition to the steady state, while housing costs
are increasing over time. Although capital may accumulate while labor emigrates
early in the transition, the causal eﬀect of immigration on capital investments and
housing costs is positive. We present new data on the evolution of net migration
flows and rental rates for housing in East Germany after 1990. Our results are
consistent with the presented evidence in the reverse migration scenario.
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“Today, the decision was taken that makes it possible for all citizens to leave
the country through East German border crossing points. [...] As far as I know -
eﬀective immediately, without delay.”1
1 Introduction
The fall of the Berlin Wall in November of 1989 can be viewed as a quasi-natural
experiment of the eﬀects of interregional labor market integration. From one day to
the next, literally overnight, East German citizens had the opportunity to move to
West Germany (and vice versa), after the sudden removal of all institutional migration
barriers. To begin with, there were no language barriers. Moreover, there were plenty
of family ties that made migration costs, other than costs associated with finding a new
shelter, almost negligible. In other words, we have seen a historically unique case of an
exogenous integration shock from fully closed to fully open borders.
This paper examines the dynamic eﬀects of interregional labor market integration
on migration patterns, private investment, wages, and the price for housing services. In
particular, we take up the challenge to explain the mechanics of the remarkable migra-
tion pattern in East Germany for the period 1991-2014. This period is characterized
by a “reversal of migration flows”, i.e. prolonged net outward migration followed by
net inward migration later on. Fig. 1 shows the net migration flows for East Germany
(“New Laender”), excluding Berlin. To smooth out business cycle fluctuations, we take
five-year annual averages for the periods 1991-1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2005 and 2006-
2010 as well as the four-year annual average for the period 2011-14. According to Fig.
1, there was a massive outflow in the 1990s and 2000s for East Germany as a whole.2
The outflow was larger for the 1990s when leaving out the state of Brandenburg that
surrounds the city of Berlin which became not only the political but also an important
economic center in reunified Germany. As many workers of Berlin-based employers are
1Guenther Schabowski (First Secretary of the East Berlin chapter of the Socialist Unity Party -
SED - in the former German Democractic Republic - GDR - and a member of the SED Politbuero),
November 9, 1989. Translated from German.
2Burda (2006) also documents for the 1990s labor outflows from East Germany that were directed
to West Germany.
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Figure 1: Net migration flows (annual averages) to the New Laender (Brandenburg,
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Saxony-Anhalt, Saxony, and Thuringia), 1991-2014.
Data: See Online Appendix.
commuting to work from Brandenburg, the state experienced net immigration in the
mid 1990s. Strikingly, the migration pattern in the New Laender has reversed to net
inflows after 2011. As displayed in Fig. 2, the reversal of migration flows is particularly
apparent for cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. It has started already in the
2000s, with the largest inflows to the two largest cities, Dresden and Leipzig. More
recently there have been positive net inflows to all East German cities.
To explain such a migration pattern, we develop a neoclassical, overlapping gener-
ations model with a tradable goods sector and a housing sector. The housing sector
combines land and residential structures, that is accumulated through construction ac-
tivities, to produce (non-tradable) housing services.3 Firms in the tradable goods sector
face capital adjustment costs to install new physical capital. We study the eﬀects of im-
plementing free interregional labor movement, conditional on initial diﬀerences (across
3This borrows from the business-cycle literature on housing and macroeconomics (Davis and Heath-
cote, 2005; Hornstein, 2008, 2009; and Favilukis et al., 2015). Chambers et al. (2009a, 2009b) employ
an OLG model with housing and mortgage markets, excluding the fixed factor land, to explain the
evolution in homeownership rates. Grossmann and Steger (2017) develop a long-term macroeconomic
model that focusses on the housing sector. Piazzesi and Schneider (2016) provide an excellent survey.
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Figure 2: Net migration flows (annual averages) to cities with more than 100,000 in-
habitants in the New Laender, 1991-2014. Data: See Online Appendix.
regions) in both the two capital stocks (physical capital and residential structures) and
total factor productivity levels. These interregional diﬀerences drive migration decisions
by determining diﬀerences in both wage rates and the price for housing services across
regions.
Our analysis suggests a causally positive (negative) eﬀect of immigration (emigra-
tion) on capital accumulation although interregional flows of labor and regional changes
in capital stocks may transitorily evolve in opposite directions.4 We demonstrate how
initial conditions and the time that has elapsed after labor market integration determine
how migration flows are related to the evolutions of capital stocks and housing costs
over time. In particular, we consider the case of low initial total productivity levels
and/or low initial capital stocks (both implying a low marginal product of labor), such
as in East Germany vis-à-vis West Germany at the time of the German reunification.
4Historically, there are examples for labor and capital to flow in the same or in opposite directions.
For instance, the Atlantic globalization in the 19th century was characterized by simultaneous capital
and labor flows from Europe to the US (e.g. O’Rourke and Williamson, 1999; Solimano and Watts,
2005). Moreover, in response to the enlargement of the European Union (EU), labor was migrating
from Southern and Eastern EU members to countries like Germany and the UK, while there were net
capital inflows in some countries with net emigration.
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We show that a net outflow of migrants may occur from the low-wage region during
an early transition period, despite lower housing costs. During this early period, there
may be accumulation of capital stocks nevertheless. Later in the transition period, the
migration pattern may be reversed, while net investments remain positive. Net invest-
ments in physical capital and structures are indeed positive during the entire transition
period to the long run equilibrium if productivity levels eventually become suﬃciently
high. The price for housing services is increasing in the aftermath of the integration
shock, as the economy develops, reflecting that increasing demand for housing over time
(implied by increasing wage income and net immigration) meets the scarcity of land.
Our analysis suggests the following explanation for the reversal of migration flows
in East Germany. From an individual point of view, emigration to West Germany
(and other developed regions) has promised a wage gain (emigration incentive) but also
required to pay a higher price for the non-tradable good "housing services" (immigration
incentive). Early during the transition period, the emigration incentive has dominated
the immigration incentive. Emigration has, however, come to a halt before wages were
equalized across regions because of the housing cost diﬀerential. Despite the early and
substantial emigration, there were incentives for net investments in physical capital
and residential structures in East Germany because TFP levels increased in response to
adopting West German institutions and enjoying a technology transfer from the West
(Burda and Severgnini, 2015). Capital accumulation and productivity gains have raised
wages, thereby reducing the emigration incentive. Rising East German wages, however,
have induced an increase in housing costs through an income eﬀect on housing demand,
thereby weakening the immigration incentive.5 Nevertheless, later during the transition
the immigration incentive (lower domestic housing costs) has started to dominate the
emigration incentive (lower domestic wages). As a result, East Germany (particularly
its cities) has experienced net immigration in recent times, along with rising wages
(associated with increasing capital stocks) and eventually rising housing costs.
The analysis also suggests that higher population density causally raises housing
costs even in the long run, i.e. after housing supply fully adjusted to the increase
5Net investments in residential structures, on the other hand, have kept housing costs low.
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in housing demand as a response to immigration. This finding is consistent with the
evidence on causally positive eﬀects of immigration on both the price for housing services
and residential construction (e.g. Gonzalez and Ortega, 2013).6 The reason is that the
production of housing services is land-intensive and land is a fixed factor that becomes
increasingly scarce in a growing economy. Thus, the price of housing services is closely
related to the rental rate of land and increasing in a growing economy (Grossmann and
Steger, 2017; Knoll, Schularick and Steger, 2017).
The main contribution of the paper is twofold. First, whereas a large literature
on the dynamic eﬀects of migration was confined to either the labor market or the
housing market separately, we shift the focus to the interaction between housing costs
and wage rates over time in determining migration patterns7 and show how it can
generate a reversal of migration patterns. While our model shares the features of
capital adjustment costs, exogenous interest rates and interregional labor mobility with
the one-sector frameworks of Rappaport (2005) and Burda (2006), their focus is on wage
convergence rather than on the reversal of migration flows.8 In fact, we argue that a
reversal of migration flows could not occur in their models even if productivity increased
6Gonzalez and Ortega (2013) employ Spanish regional data for the period 2001-2010 (characterized
by an annual population growth rate of 1.5 percent). They instrument changes in population density by
past migration stocks of the foreign-born population in a region. About half of the construction boom
in the 2000s is attributed to immigration. Saiz (2003, 2007) and Nygaard (2011) find substantial eﬀects
of immigration on rental rates and sales prices for housing in the US and UK. Jeanty et al. (2010)
estimate a two-equation spatial econometric model which captures the two-way interaction between
net migration flows and the price for housing services. Employing data from the metropolitan area
of Michigan, they find that a one percentage point increase in the rate of population growth leads to
a 0.24 percent increase in housing costs. Similarly, Degen and Fischer (2017) show that immigration
flows from 85 regions between 2001-2006 to Switzerland explains two-third of its price increases of
single-family homes.
7Important studies on wage eﬀects of immigration include Friedberg (2001) for Israel, Dustmann,
Fabbri, and Preston (2005) for the UK, and Borjas (2003) as well as Ottaviano and Peri (2012) for the
US.
8Felbermayr, Grossmann and Kohler (2015) provide an extensive literature survey on the interac-
tion between migration and capital formation. Rappaport (2005) argues that higher labor mobility
that leads to an increased outflows of workers does not necessarily increase the speed of income conver-
gence. For a given capital stock, emigration leads to increased wages in the source country. However,
emigration also drives down the shadow value of capital and therefore slows down capital investment.
The latter eﬀect results in delayed income convergence. Burda (2006) studies the dynamics of labor
migration and capital accumulation under factor adjustment costs. Per capita income of the East
German economy fully converges to the West German level as labor moves towards West Germany
and capital accumulates in the East Germany economy.
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to the level abroad, whereas the existence of a non-tradable goods sector, as in our
framework, can generate such a pattern even under constant returns to scale.9 Second,
the paper provides a new comprehensive data set for the New Laender in Germany at
the regional (county and state) level on net migration flows and on the rental costs
of housing services for the period after the German reunification until 2014. It is
demonstrated that our results are qualitatively consistent with the presented evidence.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 pro-
vides analytical results for the long run equilibrium. In Section 4, we solve the model
numerically for the transition path to the steady state in response to labor market
integration. We demonstrate the model’s potential to explain a reversal of migration
flows and discuss the salient role of the housing sector for this outcome. Section 5
demonstrates that the suggested explanation for the reversed migration phenomenon is
also consistent with the joint evolution of housing rental rates and wage rates in East
Germany after 1990. The last section concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a simple neoclassical model economy with two sectors. The tradeable goods
sector produces a final good (the "numeraire"). The non-tradable goods sector pro-
duces housing services by combining accumulable "structures" and a fixed amount of
land. Labor can be reallocated across sectors without any frictions. There is interna-
tional mobility of physical capital at an (exogenous) interest rate   0. Labor market
integration allows individuals to move between two regions ("domestic" and "foreign").
We distinguish the cases of interregionally immobile and mobile labor, investigating the
9It is well known that non-monotonic time paths of a region’s population size may occur in models
with increasing returns to scale. Faini (1996) contrasts models of exogenous and endogenous growth,
arguing that income convergence is not necessarily less likely in the case of learning-by-doing eﬀects.
Reichlin and Rustichini (1998) employ an endogenous growth model with learning-by-doing eﬀects to
show that immigration enhances interregional wage diﬀerences due to a scale eﬀect, benefitting the
receiving destination. Moreover, migration may change the skill composition of the workforce in a way
which may also benefit the source economy. Schäfer and Steger (2014) emphasize how equilibrium
selection and dynamics depend on both expectations and initial conditions in a multi-region model
where increasing returns give rise to multiple equilibria.
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eﬀects of labor market integration. Time is discrete and indexed by  = 0 1 2 
2.1 Domestic Economy
2.1.1 Firms
There is a tradable goods sector producing a homogenous good, which is chosen as
numeraire (i.e. output price  ≡ 1). The production technology of the representative
firm is given by
 =  · ¡ ¢ ()1−  (1)
 ∈ (0 1), where  denotes the amount of labor,  physical capital, and   0
total factor productivity (TFP) in the tradable goods sector.10 Accumulating physical
capital is subject to (convex) capital-adjustment costs (Abel, 1982; Hayashi, 1982).
Let  denote the amount of the tradable good that is devoted to gross investment
in the tradable goods sector. Taking the time path of the wage rate, , as given, the
representative firm solves
max
{   }∞=0
∞X
=0
 · ¡ ¢ ()1− −  −  h1 +  ³ ´i
(1 + ) (2)
s.t. +1 =  + (1− ), (3)
where   0 is the depreciation rate of physical capital and    0 are adjustment
cost parameters. 0  0 is given.
The non-tradable sector produces residential structures (a non-tradable stock) and
housing services (a non-tradable flow). The representative construction firm combines
labor,  , and materials (e.g. cement),  , to manufacture gross investment in struc-
tures,  , according to
 =  ·
¡ ¢ ()1−  (4)
 ∈ (0 1), where   0 is TFP in the construction sector. Materials are produced
from the tradable good on a one-by-one basis. The stock, , depreciates at rate   0
10The time index  is often omitted, provided that this may not lead to confusion.
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and accumulates according to
+1 =  + (1− ) (5)
=  · ¡ ¢ ()1− + (1− ), (6)
where 0  0 is given. The representative construction firm then solves
max
{  }∞=0
∞X
=0
  −  −
(1 + ) s.t. (6), (7)
taking  , , and  as given. The representative housing services firm produces a non-
tradable consumption good by combining structures and a fixed (i.e. time-invariant)
amount of land  (which equals land supply), according to
 = () 1− (8)
 ∈ (0 1).11 Denote by  the price per unit of housing services, by  the rental
rate per unit of structures, and by  the rental rate of land. Each period , the
representative housing services firm solves
max 
¡ () 1− −   −  ¢  (9)
taking  ,  , and  as given.
2.1.2 Households
Each individual lives for two periods ("working-age" and "retirement") and has one
(working-aged) child when old. In the first period, each individual supplies one unit of
labor when young to the sector with the highest wage and chooses how much to save (or
borrow). Moreover, individuals decide at the beginning of the first period whether to
stay or to migrate to the large economy, seeking to maximize life-time utility. Our simple
11TFP in the housing services sector is set to unity. A higher  captures better technology in the
housing sector as a whole.
8
overlapping-generations structure allows us to focus on one-shot migration decisions of
workers. There may be (exogenous) institutional and social migration costs: migration
reduces utility by ∆ ≥ 0 units. We assume that a worker migrates if and only if the
utility gain from migrating is equal to or higher than ∆.
The number of workers (i.e. the number of young individuals) in period  is denoted
by . Thus, total population size in period  is given by  + −1. The number of
initially old natives, −1  0, is given. In the case where labor is not interregionally
mobile, we assume a constant labor force,  = −1 for all  ≥ 0 . The population
density is given by  ≡ ( + −1). Labor market clearing requires
 +  =  (10)
Initially land is fully owned by the −1 old natives, where () denotes the landhold-
ing of individual . Landowners bequeath their landholding to their child when leaving
the scene, such that the number of landowners and the land distribution among natives
is time-invariant. For simplicity, we assume that firms in the non-tradable goods sector
are owned by foreigners. In period , a young individual  who stays in the domestic
economy thus has a present discounted value of life-time income, (), which is given
by
() =  + 
+1
1 + () (11)
For the sake of realism, suppose that a non-negligible fraction of natives is landless (for
a landless individual , () = 0).
Let 1 and 1 denote the amount of tradable goods and housing services consumed
by a working-age individual born in , respectively. Analogously, 2+1 and 2+1 are
consumption levels during retirement. Life-time utility of an individual born in period
 is given by12
() = (1() 1()) +  · (2+1() 2+1()) (12)
12This preference specification can be viewed as a dynamic extension of the static model of locational
choice by Roback (1982), who argues that diﬀerences in wage income across regions can be explained
by diﬀerent amenities associated with the chosen location, also endogenizing the rental rate of land.
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 ∈ (0 1), with instantaneous utility function
( ) =  · log + (1− ) · log  (13)
 ∈ (0 1). Recalling that  = 1, the intertemporal budget constraint of consumer 
reads as
1() +  1() + 2+1() + 
+12+1()
1 +  ≤(). (14)
We assume that the time discount rate is given by the standard condition
 · (1 + ) = 1 (15)
2.2 Foreign Economy
The foreign economy is in steady state and large in the sense that migration from or
towards the domestic economy has no eﬀect on its population density. The population
density, denoted by∗(= ∗∗), is therefore time-invariant. TFP levels in the tradable
goods sector of the foreign economy, ∗, and in the housing sector, ∗, may diﬀer from
the domestic levels,  and , respectively. Apart from productivity levels and initial
conditions, the domestic and the foreign economy are identical.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
As shown in the appendix, individual  has life-time utility
 (()   +1) ≡ max1()1()2+1()2+1()() s.t. (14) (16)
= Ω+ (1 + ) log()− (1− ) £log  +  log +1¤  (17)
with Ω ≡ (1 + ) log
³(1−)1−
1+
´
. Let ∗ denote the wage rate and ∗ the price for
housing services in the foreign economy. Moreover, define by V ≡  (   +1) and
V∗ ≡  (∗ ∗ ∗) the life-time utility (in equilibrium) of a landless native in the
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domestic and foreign economy, respectively. If labor is interregionally mobile, landless
domestic residents born in  do not want to migrate to the foreign economy as long as
V ≥ V∗+∆. Similarly, landless foreign residents born in  do not want to migrate to the
domestic economy as long as V +∆ ≤ V∗. If ∆  0, there is the possibility that, for a
given set of parameters, a multiplicity of equilibria with  = −1 (no migration) exists
whenever |V − V∗| ≤ ∆ (indeterminacy of equilibrium).13 To avoid such diﬃculty and
to capture the absence of institutional migration costs within Germany after the fall of
the Berlin Wall, we follow Roback (1982) and abstract from exogenous migration costs
in the remainder of this paper, assuming ∆ = 0. We focus on equilibria where landless
individuals are indiﬀerent whether or not to migrate under integrated labor markets,
such that
V = V∗ for  ≥ 0 (18)
If ∆ = 0, a domestic native  born in  with land holding () does not want to
migrate to the foreign economy if
 ( +  · +1()   +1)   (∗ +  · +1() ∗ ∗) (19)
Using (17) in (19), the incentive-compatibility constraint for a domestic native  born
in  with land holding () to remain in the domestic region reads as
1 + 
1−  log
µ +  · +1 · ()
∗ +  · +1 · ()
¶
 log
µ 
∗
¶
+  · log
µ+1
∗
¶
 (20)
Notice that for   0, we have +· ·∗+· ·  () ∗ if   ()∗. Thus, if in equilibrium
  ∗ and V = V∗ (i.e. landless individuals are indiﬀerent whether or not to migrate),
incentive-compatibility constraint (20) is satisfied and thus no land-owning domestic
native wants to migrate to the foreign economy. Vice versa, if   ∗ and V = V∗ holds
in equilibrium, a land-owning foreign native does not want to migrate to the domestic
13Armenter and Ortega (2011) employ a static multi-regions model with skilled and unskilled workers
under endogenous redistribution and mobility costs. In their setup, redistribution and mobility costs
aﬀect the incentives for skilled workers to migrate. Interestingly, they obtain multiple equilibria if
migration costs are relatively low.
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economy.14 The incentive to migrate is higher for landless individuals because land
rents are received from the home region irrespective of the location decision, whereas
income-related migration benefits come from wage diﬀerentials only.
3.1 Interregionally Immobile Labor
It turns out that, for all , the equilibrium levels of all factor inputs per unit of land,
 ≡  ,  ≡  ,  ≡ ,  ≡ ,  ≡ , are independent of total
land supply . Before entering the numerical analysis in Section 4, we characterize the
long-run equilibrium analytically. Denote the long-run equilibrium value before labor
market integration of any variable  by ˜ and long run TFP values by  and . All
proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Proposition 1. In an interior long run equilibrium before labor market integration,
(i) an increase in population density, , raises factor inputs per unit of land, ˜,
˜ , ˜, ˜, ˜, the price of housing services, ˜, and the rental rate of land, ˜, whereas
the wage rate, ˜, and the price of structures, ˜, do not depend on ;
(ii) an increase in the tradable goods sector’s TFP level, , raises capital inputs ˜,
˜, as well as the input of materials, ˜, the price of housing services, ˜, the rental rate
of land, ˜, the wage rate, ˜, and the price of structures, ˜ , whereas labor inputs ˜,
˜ remain unaﬀected;
(iii) an increase in the non-tradable goods sector’s TFP level, , raises ˜, lowers
both the price of housing services, ˜, and the price of structures, ˜, while the rental
rate of land, ˜, the wage rate, ˜, and inputs ˜, ˜ , ˜, ˜ remain unaﬀected.
An increase in population density  leads to higher employment in both sectors, in
turn stimulating investments in both physical capital and structures. The long run price
of housing services, ˜ , is increasing in despite a higher stock of residential structures.
14Conversely, if landless individuals are indiﬀerent whether or not to migrate although wages are
higher in the region of birth (but the price of housing services is so low that some landless individuals
migrate anyway), all landowners migrate. Although this is a theoretical possibility, wages in East
Germany were lower than in West Germany for the entire post-reunification period. Thus, we will not
consider this case.
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The result reflects a dilution eﬀect of higher population density with respect to the fixed
factor (land) when producing housing services, associated with an increase in the long
run rental rate of land, ˜ .15
In the absence of interregional labor mobility, the allocation of labor is independent
of productivity parameters,  and . Higher productivity in the tradable goods sector,
, means higher output of the tradable good for given inputs, and thus a higher relative
price of housing services,  . Consequently, it spurs accumulation of both physical
capital and structures. A higher  is also positively associated with a higher rental rate
of land,  , and a higher value of the marginal product of labor in the housing sector.
This explains why both the long run wage rate, ˜, and the long run price of structures,
˜ , are increasing in . Because of lower demand for housing services associated with
a higher ˜ , the long run allocation of labor across sectors is independent of .
Higher productivity in the housing sector, , leads to higher supply of structures,
thus being negatively associated with the price for housing services,  . At the same
time, an increase in  means that the marginal product of inputs in the housing sector
is higher for a given  . This explains why physical capital formation, the rental rate
of land and the wage rate are independent of  in the long run.
3.2 Integrated Labor Markets
Denote the long run equilibrium value after labor market integration of any variable 
by ˆ.
Proposition 2. Under integrated labor markets, the long run equilibrium population
density, ˆ, is proportional to the foreign population density, ∗, and increases in the
15These comparative-static results have interesting welfare implications. If and only if the land
estate of an individual is suﬃciently high, the positive welfare eﬀect of immigration via higher income
from land ownership dominates the negative welfare eﬀect of an increase in housing costs. Thus, there
is a threshold amount of landholding, ¯  0, such that all individuals with ()  ¯ win from labor
market integration, whereas those with ()  ¯ lose. If there is emigration, the result is reversed.
These insights give potentially rise to polarization of attitudes towards immigration in a heterogenous
population, similar to the political economy perspective of Benhabib (1996). In Benhabib (1996),
individuals diﬀer along capital holdings and develop diﬀerent attitudes depending on the fact whether
the capital-labor ratio rises or falls in response to immigration.
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relative productivity level across regions in both sectors, ∗ and ∗.
The higher the foreign population density, ∗, the higher is the (long run) price
of housing services in the foreign economy, ∗, reducing its attractiveness (part (i)
of Proposition 1). This explains why more individuals want to live in the domestic
economy. An increase in the relative productivity across regions of the tradable goods
sector, ∗, has two counteracting eﬀects on the steady state population density of
the domestic economy when labor is interregionally mobile. First, before labor market
integration, an increase in ∗ raises the long run wage rate of individuals in the do-
mestic relative to the foreign economy, ˜∗ (part (ii) of Proposition 1) such that the
domestic economy becomes more attractive for workers. Second, for a given population
density, it also raises the long run price for housing services in the domestic region rela-
tive to the foreign region, ˜∗, lowering the attractiveness of the domestic economy.
The first eﬀect dominates the second one. By contrast, an increase in the relative pro-
ductivity of the non-tradable goods sector, ∗, has no eﬀect on ˜∗ (part (iii) of
Proposition 1), but lowers ˜∗ for given labor inputs, making the domestic economy
more attractive. Thus, ˆ rises.
4 Numerical Analysis
We now turn to numerical analysis in order to investigate the role of initial conditions
and the evolution of TFP for the evolution of migration flows in response to labor
market integration.16 The key is to understand the dynamic interaction of migration
flows on the one hand and the evolution of the wage rate, the price for housing services,
the formation of physical capital and structures on the other hand. We will argue that
the model can explain why migration outflows and positive net investments in both
physical capital and structures may occur at the same time, while the causal eﬀect of
higher migration inflows on investments is positive. Most importantly, we will show
that migration flows can be reversed over time if the integration shock happens in a
16We apply the relaxation algorithm for our numerical analysis (Trimborn, Koch and Steger, 2008).
Mathematica codes used in this section are available upon request.
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capital-poor economy (possibly also characterized by low TFP levels), such as in East
Germany shortly after the fall of the iron curtain.
4.1 Calibration
We shall emphasize that, despite implementing a reasonable model calibration, our goal
is to characterize transitional dynamics qualitatively rather than quantitatively. On the
one hand, for a quantitative analysis, our two-period overlapping-generations structure
is too stylized. On the other hand, the simplicity allows us to gain solid intuitions into
the underlying economic mechanisms.
Assuming an annual real interest rate of 2 percent and a length of a generation of
about 35 years suggests that  = 1; thus  = 05, according to (15). Empirical evidence
points to a budget share on housing of about one third (e.g. Johnson, Rogers and Tan,
2001), which suggests  = 23. Moreover, we set  = 025 and  = 05 which reflects
an annual depreciation rate of about two percent in the housing sector and four percent
in the tradable goods sector, respectively.
We also employ the standard quadratic specification of capital adjustment costs,
which means that we set  = 1. In addition, we assume  = 05 which implies that, in
a steady state with  =  = 05, one unit of gross investment in physical capital
requires 1 +  · ¡¢ = 125 units of the tradable good.
Since all quantities can be expressed relative to land endowment , we set  = 1
without loss of generality. For output elasticities in the housing sector, we set  =  =
05. Finally, we normalize ∗ = 1 and assume that without labor market integration
population densities are the same across regions; that is, with  = 1, we assume
−1 = 05. Thus, we abstract from eﬀects that come from initially diﬀerent population
densities across regions.
4.2 Labor Market Integration Eﬀects
We display the dynamic eﬀects of labor market integration on the labor force, wage
rate and the price for housing services, whereas for the sake of brevity the evolution of
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the other variables are relegated to the Online Appendix. We focus on the case that
captures the initial conditions of East Germany at the time of the re-unification with
West Germany. Suppose that initial stocks of both physical capital and structures (in
1990) are below the (hypothetical) long run values without labor market integration,
i.e. 0  ˜ and 0  ˜. Moreover, the domestic TFP levels in  = 0 do not exceed
the foreign ones (0 ≤ ∗, 0 ≤ ∗). To isolate the role of initial capital stocks, the
first experiment (Fig. 3 below) assumes time-invariant TFP parameters that are equal
to the foreign economy (0 = ∗, 0 = ∗). The second experiment (Fig. 4 below)
then allows for time-dependent TFP levels (, ) that start below the foreign levels
(0  ∗, 0  ∗). We view this case as a plausible description of East Germany vis-à-
vis West Germany (or, more generally, Eastern Europe vis-à-vis Western and Northern
Europe) at the time of the fall of the iron curtain. In 1990, both capital stocks were
lower than their hypothetical steady state levels without integrated labor markets (˜,
˜) even though prior to that TFP levels in East Germany were much lower (as were ˜
and ˜), reflecting bad institutions and inferior technology of a non-market economy.
East German TFP levels increased after adoption of West German institutions and have
risen thereafter due to technology transfers (Burda and Severgnini, 2015)
Denote by ˜ and ˆ the equilibrium level of a variable  in period  ≥ 0 for initial
values (0 0 −1) without and with an integrated labor market, respectively, and
(with a slight abuse of notation) continue to denote (as in section 3) by ˜ and ˆ the
corresponding steady state levels. According to (18), by definition, we have
 (ˆ ˆ  ˆ+1) = V∗ for  ≥ 0 (21)
First, in order to illustrate the implications of low initial capital stocks in isolation,
Fig. 3 displays the transitional dynamics for the case where  = ∗ and  = ∗
for all . Because TFP is the same as in the foreign economy, steady state values
before and after labor market integration coincide with foreign values, ˜ = ˆ = ∗,
˜ = ˆ = ∗, ˆ = ∗ = −1 = ˜, ˜ = ˆ = ∗, ˜ = ˆ = ∗. The dotted lines
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Figure 3: Transitional dynamics for an initially capital-poor economy assuming labor
market integration at  = 0 (solid lines) and assuming that labor markets remain
closed (dotted lines). Parameter configuration:  = ∗ =  = ∗ = 5, 0 = 08˜,
0 = 08˜.
show the transitional dynamics that occur without integrated labor markets, whereas
the solid lines illustrate transitional dynamics when the labor market is opened up
at time  = 0. Because the economy is initially capital-poor (0  ˜, 0  ˜),
before labor market integration, the marginal product of labor (and thus the wage
rate) is initially lower than the foreign level (˜0  ∗). In response to labor market
integration, this triggers oﬀ emigration on impact (ˆ0  −1), associated with a drop
in sectoral labor inputs,  and  (see Online Appendix), and an associated increase
in the wage rate compared to the pre-integration case, ˜0  ˆ0, despite the price for
housing being initially lower than in the foreign economy. Emigration further reduces
housing costs. In sum, ˆ0  ˜0  ∗. The low initial housing costs also imply
that migration does not equalize wages across regions, ˆ0  ∗. Also notably, despite
emigration, there is accumulation of both physical capital and residential structures,
given our assumption that both stocks are initially below steady state and TFP levels
are at the foreign level. Because emigration reduces the investment incentives compared
to the pre-integration case, both types of capital accumulate more slowly than in the
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pre-integration case, as displayed in the Online Appendix. That is, the causal eﬀect
of emigration is to lower investment in both sectors. Over time, and after the initial
drop of population density, the size of the workforce rises along with rising wage rates
that are triggered oﬀ by accumulation of physical capital and structures from  = 1
onwards. The price of housing services rises over time because of increased demand for
housing that is associated with increasing wages and (for the solid line) the reversal of
the migration flows to immigration. The transition to the steady state level ˜ = ˆ
is slower than without labor market integration.
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Figure 4: Transitional dynamics for an economy that initially is capital-poor and has low
TFP levels assuming labor market integration at  = 0 (solid lines) and assuming that
labor markets remain closed (dotted lines). Parameter configuration: 0 = 096∗ =
48, 0 = 096∗ = 48, 0 = 055˜, 0 = 085˜.  and  increase according to a
logistic function to 100 percent of the foreign TFP level only in the case of labor market
integration (solid lines).
The experiment displayed in Fig. 4 does not only assume that initial state variables
start below the pre-integration steady state values (0  ˜, 0  ˜), but also that
domestic TFP parameters start below the foreign levels (0  ∗, 0  ∗). These
border conditions capture the economic fundamentals of the East German economy
at the time of the reunification most accurately. We also assume that TFP levels
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converge gradually to 100 percent of the foreign level (lim→∞ = ∗, lim→∞ =
∗) when labor markets are integrated, whereas they remain at initial levels without
labor market integration. Increasing TFP levels over time are certainly plausible for
the post-reunification transition in East Germany because of technology transfers and
institutional improvements from advanced economies to East Germany (particularly
from West German firms that opened plants in the New Laender after 1990). Physical
capital and structures decumulate for a while shortly after labor market integration,
whereas the stocks accumulate in the pre-integration case (as displayed in the Online
Appendix). When TFP levels become suﬃciently high, there is again a reversal of
migration flows in parallel with rising wage rates, a rising price for housing services and
rising capital stocks. This is the reversed migration phenomenon we observe in East
Germany, according to Fig. 1 and 2, particularly in cities that are the economically
most active regions.
Only if TFP levels remain suﬃciently low also in the long run, it is possible that
˜  0  ˆ and ˜  0  ˆ. In this case, emigration and decumulation of
capital occurs at the same time and there is no reversed migration. In the case of East
Germany, however, there was technology transfer from advanced regions, foremost West
Germany, along with capital accumulation. Hence, the premises underlying Fig. 4 are
more plausible.
4.3 Digging Deeper Into Reversed Migration
What is the economic intuition behind the reversal of migration flows over time? To
address this question, we disentangle, for each period of time, the overall migration
incentive. Subsequently, it is shown that the existence of a non-tradable goods sector is
necessary for a reversal of net migration flows in experiments that underlie Fig. 3 and
Fig. 4.
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4.3.1 Migration Incentives
We introduce a measure for the incentives that govern net migration flows in each
period. Consider the diﬀerence in life-time utility between the domestic and the foreign
economy, assuming that, for given equilibrium values of state variables under integrated
labor markets until period , (ˆ ˆ), the equilibrium labor force of the previous period
under integrated labor markets will prevail from period  onwards, i.e.  = ˆ−1 for all
 ≥ 1.17 Denote the wage rate and the price for housing services in period  ≥  that
results when holding labor supply in period  constant at its open economy equilibrium
level in the previous period  − 1 by ˇ| and ˇ| , respectively. We assume the same
parameter configuration as in the case of integrated labor markets, displayed in Fig.
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Figure 5: Migration incentives: Life-time utility diﬀerence  (ˇ|  ˇ|  ˇ+1| )− V∗ and
its decomposition into a wage component and a housing cost component in an economy
that is initially capital-poor and has low TFP levels. Parameter configuration as in the
case of integrated labor markets in Fig. 4.
Fig. 5 displays  (ˇ|  ˇ|  ˇ+1| ) − V∗ for 0 ≤  ≤ 30, capturing the sequence
of life-time utility diﬀerentials that measure, for each period, the migration incentive.
For period 0, like in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, wage rates are lower and housing costs are
17For  = 0, we consider the utility diﬀerence to the foreign economy for given initial values of state
variables (00) and population size held constant at  = −1 for all  ≥ 0 (i.e. the labor market
never integrates).
18In particular, TFP levels are gradually increasing over time, in contrast to the case without labor
market integration in Fig. 4.
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higher without labor market integration. Formally, as  (ˆ0 ˆ0  ˆ1 ) = V∗, according
to (21), we have ˜0 = ˇ0|0  ˆ0, ˜0 = ˇ0|0  ˆ0 , ˜1 = ˇ1|0  ˆ1 , and thus,
 (ˇ0|0  ˇ0|0  ˇ1|0 )  V∗. Consequently, there is emigration (ˆ0  −1), as displayed in
Fig. 4. Similarly, for period 1, we have  (ˇ1|1  ˇ1|1  ˇ2|1 )  V∗, implying an outward
migration flow also in period 1. From period 2 onwards, the life-time utility diﬀerential
− represented by the black bars in Fig. 5 − is positive, i.e.  (ˇ|  ˇ|  ˇ+1| )  V∗
for  ≥ 2, indicating a net incentive for inward migration. Again, this observation is
consistent with inward migration from period 2 onwards in Fig. 4.
To gain a deeper intuition, it is instructive to decompose the life-time utility dif-
ferential into a component that is caused by relative wage rates and a component that
results from relative prices for housing services (contemporaneously and in the next
period). According to (17), the “wage component” is given by (1+) log(∗), while
the “housing cost component” reads −(1 − ) £log( ∗) +  log(+1∗)¤. Both
components are also shown in Fig. 5. The wage component is negative throughout
and provides an emigration incentive, whereas the housing cost component is positive
throughout and provides an immigration incentive. In periods 0 and 1, the wage compo-
nent dominates, whereas from period 2 onwards the housing cost component dominates.
Both components become smaller over time when the economy converges to the foreign
economy. As wage gains from emigration are declining more quickly than losses from
higher housing costs abroad, migration flows do actually reverse over time.
4.3.2 The Role of the Housing Sector for Reversed Migration
We have just seen why reversed migration may occur in our two-sector economy with a
non-tradable good such that (indirect) life-time utility depends on the relative price for
housing services in addition to relative wages across regions. If both goods were freely
tradable, the relative price between the two consumption goods would equalize across
regions and migration incentives would depend on the wage component only, as in a
one-sector model.
One could then ask whether a reversal of migration flows is possible in a one-sector
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model with a tradable good. We therefore analyze the special case  = 1 (i.e.  = 0
and  =  for all ), where the no-arbitrage condition V = V∗ that, under integrated
labor markets, makes workers indiﬀerent between migrating and staying boils down to
wage rate equalization. That is, ˆ = ∗ for all  ≥ 0, according to (17).
The full analysis of the one-sector model is relegated to the Appendix. To summarize
the results, as the wage rate equals the marginal product of labor, it holds for all
 ≥ 0 that  · ()1− = ∗ · (∗∗)1−. Again suppose −1 = ∗, 0  ∗,
0 ≤ ∗. In period 0, when labor markets integrate, the labor force jumps downward to
0 = 0(0∗) 11−∗∗ ≡ ˆ0  −1 on impact. If  = ∗ for all  ≥ 0 (as in Fig.
3), one can show that ˆ = ˆ0 and ˆ = 0 for all  ≥ 0, sustained by gross investments
equal to 0. In other words, the economy − that may have been on a transition
path with gradual capital accumulation before labor market integration − jumps into
the steady state by adjusting the amount of workers through emigration at the time of
labor market integration. A reversal of migration flows over time cannot occur, unlike
in Fig. 3.19 In the case where 0  ∗ and TFP level  rises over time to the foreign
level (as in Fig. 4), the capital stock shrinks over time and there is further emigration
along the transition to the stationary equilibrium. Again, net migration flows do not
reverse.
5 Empirical Evidence: The Case of East Germany
In this section, we argue that the reversed migration scenario displayed in Fig. 3 and
Fig. 4 is consistent with the evidence on net migration flows, the evolution of wages
and the evolution of housing costs in the New German Laender after the fall of the
Berlin Wall. Details on the data construction and robustness checks are relegated to
the Online Appendix.
19In the one-sector models of Rappaport (2005) and Burda (2006), there are exogenous limits to
labor force adjustments each period such that emigration is stretched over time until wage rates have
converged. A reversal of migration flows cannot occur either.
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5.1 Net Migration Flows
Fig. 1 and 2 in the introduction are based on a new data set on net migration flows for
the period 1991-2014 at the district level in East Germany. So far, the data were not
publicly available for any district in the New Laender before 1995 and were also not
available for most districts after 2007.20
The migration data set used for Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 is based on net migration balances,
accounting for movements across the borders of administrative districts (NUTS 3 units
in the EUROSTAT typology for all five New Laender in Germany). The districts in
the New Laender were subject to numerous border reforms between 1991 and 2014,
reducing their number considerably. To get consistent data over the entire period 1991
to 2014, one territorial status was chosen and reconstructed for the periods with diﬀering
district borders. The longest period not marked by significant territorial reforms lasted
from 1995 to 2006. Thus, we selected the territorial boundaries during that period of
time. For the periods before (1991-1994) and after the reference period (2007-2014), the
municipalities (corresponding to LAU2 units) were assigned to the districts to whom
they belonged during the reference period and their net migration balances were added
up to reconstruct the data at the district-level.
To sum up the discussion in the introduction, we see a reversal of migration flows
particularly in East German cities. Fig. 4 based on the theoretical model suggests
that outflows are highest early in the transition, whereas Fig. 1 and 2 shows that
migration outflows was higher in the second half than in the first of the 1990s. This
may not only reflect a kind of behavioral inertia of workers, especially in more rural
areas (Burda, 1993), but may also reflect massive public investment in the early 1990s in
East Germany ("Aufbau Ost"), as discussed in OECD (2001). Overall, Fig. 3 and Fig.
4 are consistent with the evidence on the decline in emigration flows and an eventual
reversal to net inflows.
20The reason for this limited data availability up to now were subsequent changes in county borders
resulting from administrative reforms. We worked with the Statistical Oﬃces of the New Laender to
complete the data set. Their collaboration with us is gratefully acknowledged.
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5.2 Wages
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 also suggest that the reversed migration pattern is associated with
gradual increases in both wage rates and rental rates of housing that are pronounced
in the early transition phase. According to Fig. 5, the average wage income per worker
in all the New Laender shows incomplete convergence to the West German level.
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Figure 6: Real wage income per worker relative to West Germany (without Berlin) in
the New Laender, 1991-2014. Data: Federal Ministry of Finance, Germany.
Wages increased particularly fast in the 1990s. Not all of that was market-driven,
as trade unions pushed to harmonize wages in Germany. This was associated with com-
paratively high unemployment rates in East Germany. Consistent with the theoretical
considerations, however, wages in the Eastern Laender relative to the Western German
wage level continued to increase (along with a decline in unemployment rates) in the
2000s as well, suggesting that TFP levels do not yet coincide.
5.3 Rental Rates for Housing
Finally, we relate the evolution of rental rates for housing over time in the New Laender
to our model, by constructing a comprehensive data set on rental housing in East
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Germany that has not yet been used elsewhere (for West Germany, see Fitzenberger and
Fuchs, 2016). The data on housing costs come from the German Socio-Economic Panel
Study (SOEP), a representative annual household panel survey that oﬀers detailed
information on rental housing from the perspective of tenants. The final data set
consists of 107,514 private households who live in rental apartments between 1984 and
2014 in West Germany and 34,248 private households who live in rental apartments
between 1990 and 2014 in East Germany.
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Figure 7: Evolution of raw average rental payments per square meter per month in
East Germany vs. West Germany. Note: Index with the average rent in East Germany
in year 1990 as basis value (= 100). Data: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP),
version 31.
Fig. 6 visualizes the evolution of the "raw" average monthly rental payments per
square metre for East Germany (since 1990) and West Germany (since 1984) over time,
employing the full sample. While West German rental rates show no trend since the
early 1990s (consistent with a steady state), the price for housing services increased fast
in East Germany in the 1990s. In the 2000s it was six times as high as in 1990. As for
wages, we observe incomplete convergence to West German levels.21
21The speed of the increase in the 1990s was certainly slowed down by regulations that limited
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Figure 8: Evolution of quality-adjusted average rental payments per square meter in
the New Laender. Note: Index with the average rent in East Germany in year 1990 as
basis value (= 100). Data: German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), version 31.
Fig. 7 shows the evolution of average rental payments per square metre for the
New Laender (including East Berlin) based on a standard hedonic pricing model that
accounts for variation in apartment quality. We control for the year of construction,
the type of location area (new residential, old residential, mixed or other), the general
apartment condition, and whether the apartment is equipped with a garden, a bal-
cony/terrace, central heating and a basement. Because of the panel structure of the
data, we are also able to control for fixed eﬀects at the apartment level.22 Comparing
Fig. 7 to Fig. 6 shows that the evolution of quality-adjusted housing costs is similar
to the raw average in East Germany in Fig. 6 across all New Laender (including East
Berlin).
upward rent adjustments, especially but not exclusively for those already living in the same apartment
before October 1990 (Neumann and Schaper, 2008). These special regulations ended in January 1998
after which the regulations coincided with those in West Germany (i.e. rental rates for housing must
not exceed a certain percentage of the local average for comparable apartments).
22The Online Appendix describes the underlying estimation procedure and the data in detail. We
also present further results that demonstrate robustness.
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The evolution of  in Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, based on the reversed migration case of
the theoretical model, is qualitatively consistent with Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, particularly for
the 1990s where we see gradual increases in rental rates for East Germany. The reason
why rental rates have been rather flat during the 2000s (while the theoretical model
would predict further increases) may be rooted in new rental price regulation policy,
beside slow economic growth in Germany as a whole during the 2000s. In a study for
the Old Laender, Fitzenberger and Fuchs (2017) show that the tenancy law reform act
in 2001 reduced apartment rents significantly for new leases. The negative reform eﬀect
diminishes with the duration of a tenancy. Thus, households who live in tenancies that
are aﬀected by the reform benefit less from being sitting tenants than households in
tenancies that started before September 2001. However, there are also regulations that
limit rental rate increases for sitting tenants in Germany. These regulations may have
contributed to slow growth of rental rates after 2001 for reasons that are not captured
in our simple theoretical model.
6 Concluding Remarks
This paper has examined the impact of labor market integration on migration, capital
formation, wages, the rental rate of land, and the price for housing services in an
intertemporal model with a tradable goods sector and a housing sector. Our framework
is capable to explain that net migration flows reverse like, for instance, in (urban)
East Germany in the aftermath of the sudden fall of the iron curtain (and the Berlin
wall) in 1989. The pattern is driven by low initial capital stocks and possibly also
by low productivity levels that are increasing over time. The mechanism which acts
as a drag on migration flows and prevents wage equalization, once free movement of
labor is implemented, is that in an economy with a non-tradable good like housing,
diﬀerences in housing costs across regions determine interregional utility diﬀerences,
in addition to wage diﬀerences. Once labor productivity is rising over time via capital
accumulation, the net migration flowmay reverse along with rising wage rates and rising
housing costs. This evolution of wages and rental rates of housing is consistent with
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the evidence for post-unification East Germany, exploiting the unique case of complete
labor market integration and institutional harmonization across regions and the fact
that East Germany was capital-poor at the time the iron curtain fell.
More generally, we have examined how initial conditions (i.e. initial levels of popu-
lation density, productivity levels, and capital stocks) aﬀect the direction of migration
flows over time along with other key variables. We have demonstrated that capital
inflows and emigration can occur at the same time, leading to a reversal of migration
flows in the aftermath. Our analysis also suggests that, nevertheless, the causal eﬀect
of immigration on capital investments and housing costs is unambiguously positive. It
is thus useful for empirical analyses of the interaction between migration, the price
for housing services, and residential capital investment by helping to address potential
endogeneity biases.23
Under alternative initial conditions, the model could imply continuous immigration
or continuous emigration in response to labor market integration. For instance, consis-
tent with our framework, there were massive net immigration flows to Switzerland (a
high-productivity economy with a high capital-to-labor ratio) along with rising prices
for housing services in the aftermath of the bilateral agreement with the European
Union on the free movement of labor.24 We focussed on the German case after 1989,
however, because this historical episode was shaped by a unique experiment that allows
us to better understand the dynamic general equilibrium mechanics of migration and
capital accumulation in general and the reversed migration phenomenon in particular.
Future research may exploit our setup to study the political economy side of migra-
tion policy.25 Heterogeneity in the ownership of land may be important for distribu-
23Empirical studies have emphasized the role of wage diﬀerences across regions (e.g. Grogger and
Hanson, 2011) and the role of migrant networks (Beine, Docquier and Ozden, 2011) for migration
flows. We emphasize the need to account for diﬀerences in housing costs as well.
24The agreement was signed in 2002 and came into full eﬀect (with respect to 17 EU countries,
excluding Eastern Europe) in 2007. The case of Switzerland is discussed in detail in the working paper
version of this paper (Grossmann, Schäfer and Steger, 2013). Inflows of similar magnitudes along with
rising housing costs and a residential construction boom has been observed for Spain after introduction
of the Euro as currency (Gonzalez and Ortega, 2013). The construction boom in Spain ended with
the financial crises in 2008.
25See e.g. Benhabib (1906) for an important study based on heterogeneity of capital holdings of both
natives and immigrants. De la Croix and Docquier (2014) propose a very interesting recent political
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tional consequences in response to labor market integration, caused by changes in the
rental rate of land and housing costs. This may help to understand political debates
on and resistance to immigration even when migration inflows have negligible eﬀects
on the domestic labor market.26
Appendix
Derivation of (17). We omit household index  and solve the household problem in
two steps. In the first step, the intertemporal consumption problem is solved. Define
a Cobb-Douglas consumption index,  := 1− such that instantaneous utility is
given by log C, according to (13). Consumption expenditure in a given period can be
expressed as
 ·  = +  (22)
where  denotes an appropriately defined price index (see below). Life-time utility
of an individual born in  reads as  = log1 +  log2+1, with intertemporal
budget constraint 2+12+1 = (1 + ) ( − 11), according to (14). Solving the
intertemporal household problem implies
11 = 1
1 +  (23)
2+12+1
1 +  =

1 +  (24)
In the second step, we analyze the static problems. Given the amount of first-period
economy perspective of a host country. In their model, higher immigration in a single country does not
raise welfare from a nationalist point of view whereas a coordinated increase in immigration quotas of a
group of rich countries may lead to a Pareto improvement under an appropriate tax-subsidy scheme. In
our set up, the challenge would be to achieve a Pareto improvement within a region when immigration
produces winners and losers.
26Switzerland would be a prime example. In a widely discussed referendum on February 9, 2014,
Switzerland voted for restricting immigration by opting out of its bilateral agreement with the European
Union on the free movement of labor (with a 50.3 percent majority). This was seen as remarkable
by commentators, as labor market eﬀects were largely invisible despite massive immigration since the
agreement came into full eﬀect in 2007. However, the main discussion in Switzerland centered on rising
prices for housing services.
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consumption expenditure in (23), the household solves
max
11
log
£
(1) (1)1−¤ s.t. 1
1 +  = 1 + 
 1 (25)
Hence,
1 = 
1− 
 1 (26)
which combined with the first-period budget constraint in (25) implies
1 = 
1 +  1 =
1− 
1 + 

  (27)
Similarly, given the amount of second-period consumption expenditures in (24), the
household solves
max2+12+1
log
£
(2+1) (2+1)1−¤ s.t.  (1 + )
1 +   = 2+1 + 
+12+1 (28)
Hence, we get
2+1 = 
1− 
+12+1 (29)
which combined with (1 + )  = 1 and the second-period budget constraint in (28)
leads to
2+1 = 
1 +  2+1 =
1− 
1 + 

+1  (30)
Inserting (27) and (30) into the intertemporal utility function (12) confirms (17). It
remains to be shown that there exists a price index as used above. Using  = 1−,
the price index  may be expressed as
 = + 

 =
³ 

´1−
+ 
µ

¶
 (31)
Noting that  =

1− one gets
 = ¡¢1− "µ 
1− 
¶1−
+
µ
1− 

¶#
 (32)
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This concludes the proof. ¥
Proof of Proposition 1. We consider (i) the optimization problems of firms, (ii)
market clearing in the non-tradable consumption good, (iii) the dynamic system, and
(iv) the long run equilibrium from which we derive comparative static results.
Ad (i): Denote by  the shadow price of physical capital in numeraire sector, i.e.
the multiplier to capital accumulation constraint (3) in the profit maximization problem
(2) of firms in the numeraire goods sector. The associated Lagrangian function is given
by
L ≡
∞X
=0
µ
1
1 + 
¶ ¡ · ¡ ¢ ()1− −  −

∙
1 + 
µ

¶¸
+  ·
£ + ¡1− ¢ −+1¤¶  (33)
The associated first-order conditions L =
L
 =
L
+1 = 0 imply
 · ·
µ

¶1−
=  (34)

 =
µ  − 1
( + 1) 
¶ 1  (35)
(1− )+1 + (1− ) ·+1 ·
µ+1
+1
¶
+ 
µ +1
+1
¶+1
= (1 + )  (36)
Combining and (35) with (36) leads to
(1− )+1 + (1− ) ·+1 ·
µ+1
+1
¶
+

 1
µ+1 − 1
 + 1
¶+1
= (1 + )  (37)
whereas combining (3) and (35) implies
+1
 =
µ  − 1
( + 1) 
¶ 1
+ 1−   (38)
According to (9), we have the following first-order conditions of the representative
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housing services firm:

µ

¶−1
=   (39)

 =
µ 
(1− )
¶ 1  (40)
Combining (39) and (40) yields
 = ( ) 1
µ
1− 

¶ 1−
(41)
Denote by  the shadow price of structures, i.e. the multiplier to constraint (6) in
the profit maximization problem (7) of construction firms. The associated Lagrangian
function is given by
L ≡
∞X
=0
µ
1
1 + 
¶ ¡  −  −+
 ·
h
 · ¡ ¢ ()1− + ¡1− ¢ −+1i´  (42)
The associated first-order conditions L =
L
 =
L
+1 = 0 imply
 ·  · ·
µ

¶−1
=  (43)
 = 1 · (1− )
µ

¶
 (44)
+1 + (1− )+1 = (1 + )  (45)
Combining (43) with (44) and using (34) implies
 · ·
µ

¶1−
=

1− 

  (46)
Combining (44) with (45) and using (41) implies
 · (1− ) (+1) 1
µ
1− 
+1
¶ 1−
+ (1− )
µ+1
+1
¶
= (1 + )
µ

¶
 (47)
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Ad (ii): The market clearing condition for non-tradables reads as
 =
Z 
0
1()di +
Z −1
0
2()di (48)
Using (11) and (15) in (27) and (30), demand functions for the non-tradable good of a
young and an old individual  in period  are given by
1() = 1− 
1 + 
 + +1()
  2() =
1− 
1 + 
−1 +  ()
  (49)
respectively. Substituting both (8) and (49) into (48) yields
µ

¶
=
1− 
1 + 
  + −1−1 + (+1 +  )
  (50)
Using (40) in (50) leads to
 = (1− ) (1− )1 + 
∙
 + −1
−1
 +  · (
+1 +  )
¸
 (51)
Ad (iii): Recall notation  = ,  =  ,  = ,  =  and
 = . Also let  ≡ . Prior to labor market integration, for a given sequence
of cohort sizes per unit of land, {}∞=−1, the sequences of quantities {     +1
+1}∞=0 and prices {          }∞=0 are given by
+1 =  · ¡ ¢ ()1− + (1− ). (52)
 +  =  (53)
 =  · ·
µ

¶1−
 (54)
(1− )+1 + (1− ) ·+1 ·
µ +1
+1
¶
+

 1
µ+1 − 1
 + 1
¶+1
= (1 + )  (55)
+1
 =
µ  − 1
( + 1) 
¶ 1
+ 1−  (56)
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 =
µ 
(1− )
¶ 1  (57)
 = ( ) 1
µ
1− 

¶ 1−
(58)
 = 1 · (1− )
µ

¶
 (59)
 · ·
µ

¶1−
=

1− 

  (60)
 · (1− ) (+1) 1
µ
1− 
+1
¶ 1−
+ (1− )
µ+1
+1
¶
= (1 + )
µ

¶
 (61)
 = (1− ) (1− )1 + 
£ + −1−1 + (+1 +  )¤  (62)
according to (6), (10), (34), (37), (38), (40), (41), (44), (46), (47), (51), respectively.
Ad (iv): In long-run equilibrium, the values of quantities {      } and
prices {         } are time-invariant. According to (56), we obtain the
long run shadow values of physical capital as
˜ = 1 +  ( + 1) ¡¢  (63)
Using (63) in (55) gives us
˜
˜ =
Ã
(1− ) ·
 +  +  ( + 1) ¡¢ +  ¡¢+1
! 1
 (64)
Substituting (64) into (54) and (46) leads to
˜ = Ω · 1 , (65)
˜
˜ =
1− 
 Ω ·
1
  (66)
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respectively, where
Ω ≡ 
Ã
1− 
 +  +  ( + 1) ¡¢ +  ¡¢+1
! 1−
 (67)
Using (66) in (59), we find
˜ = − (1− )−(1−)Ω · 


  (68)
Without interregional labor mobility,  =  = −1 for all  = −1 0 1  and
population density reads as  = 2. Substituting (65) into (62), we obtain the long run
rental rate of land as
˜ = (1− ) (1− )
1 + − 2 (1− ) (1− )Ω ·
1
 · (69)
Using (66) and (69) into (61), in long run equilibrium,
˜ =
Ã
 + 
 (1− )1− ·
! µ
(1− ) ·
1 + − 2 (1− ) (1− )
¶1−
Ω1−(1−) · 1−(1−) 
(70)
Using (69) and (70) in (41) and (57), we obtain
˜ = ¡ + ¢− (1− )−(1−)Ω ·    (71)
˜ = 
 (1− )1−  (1− )
1 + − 2 (1− ) (1− )
Ω1−
 +  ·
1−
 · · (72)
respectively. Moreover, according to (52) and (66),
˜ = 
 ˜

³
1−
 Ω · 1
´1− =  (1− )1 + − 2 (1− ) (1− )  +  · (73)
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where the latter follows after substituting (72).27 Substituting (73) into (53), we find
˜ =  − ˜ =
µ
1− 2 (1− )
1 + − 2 (1− ) (1− )

 + 
¶
· 
2
 (74)
With these expressions, it is easy to confirm comparative-static results. ¥
Proof of Proposition 2. With integrated labor markets, recalling ∆ = 0, equi-
librium condition (18) that governs migration holds, i.e.
log
³
∗
´
= (1− ) ·
log
³ ∗´+  log³+1∗ ´
1 +   (75)
according to (17), where ∗ and ∗ are the wage rate and price for housing services in
the foreign economy. Recall that the foreign economy is in steady state by assumption
and may diﬀer from the domestic economy in TFP parameters (∗ ∗) and population
density ∗ only. Thus, according to (65) and (70), we have
˜
∗ =
µ 
∗
¶ 1  (76)
˜
∗ =
µ 
∗
¶1−(1−)  (77)
respectively. Let us denote the long run population density with integrated labor mar-
kets by ˆ. Using (76) and (77) in (75), we obtain
ˆ
∗ =
¡ 
∗
¢+(1−)(1−)(1−)(1−)¡∗

¢ 
1−
 (78)
This confirms comparative-static results. ¥
Comparison to one-sector model (section 4.3.2). The absence of the non-
27For an interior long run equilibrium to exist, it must hold that ˜  , i.e.
 (1− )
1 + − 2 (1− ) (1− )

 +  
1
2

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tradable goods sector is implied by  = 1. Thus,  =  and, with an integrated
labor market, the equilibrium wage equalizes to that of the foreign region, ˆ = ∗ for
all  ≥ 0. Thus, under integrated labor markets,
 =
µ
∗
¶ 1
1− ∗
∗ for all  ≥ 0 (79)
according to (34). According to (38), we have
+1 − =
"µ  − 1
( + 1) 
¶ 1 − # (80)
We now denote the shadow price of capital and the depreciation rate by  and ,
respectively. In the foreign economy, the shadow value of capital is at its steady state
level by assumption, i.e. ∗ = 1 +  ( + 1) , according to (80). Thus, analogously to
(64), we find that the equilibrium capital stock in the foreign economy, ∗, is given by
∗ =
µ
(1− )∗
 +  +  ( + 1)  + +1
¶ 1 ∗ (81)
Inserting (79) into (37) and using (81) implies
 =
(1− )+1 +
³+1
∗
´ 1
1− £ +  +  ( + 1)  + +1¤+ 1 ³+1−1+1 ´1+1
1 + 
≡  (+1 +1) (82)
We assume that 0  ∗. Note that function  is increasing in both arguments,
 (∗ ∗) = ∗,  (1 ∗)  1, and ( )  1 for all  ≤ ∗. Let us denote by ¯() a
level of  that solves  (¯ ) = ¯. Thus, for   ∗, ¯()  ∗.
According to (81) and (82), a stationary equilibrium in the domestic economy under
integrated labor markets with economic activity requires lim→∞ = ∗. We now
discuss two scenarios where full TFP convergence holds, (i) TFP is time-invariant at
the foreign level (as for Fig. 3) and (ii)   ∗ eventually converges to the foreign
level (as for Fig. 4 and Fig. 5).
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Ad (i): If  = ∗ for all  ≥ 0, we have ˆ = ∗ [= ¯(∗)] for all  ≥ 0, according
to (82). That is, the equilibrium shadow value of capital with integrated labor market
jumps to the foreign steady state level. Thus, ˆ = 0, according to (80), implying
ˆ = ˆ0 for all  ≥ 0, according to (79), i.e. reverse migration cannot occur.
Ad (ii): If +1  ∗, then ˆ  ∗ and thus ˆ+1  ˆ and ˆ+1  ˆ, according
to (80) and (79). Hence, both the capital stock and the labor force are shrinking over
time. If  converged to the foreign level, factor outflows would stop, but there cannot
be reverse migration.
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This Online Appendix provides further details for the empirical evidence
for East Germany in the paper (data sources, discussions of construction of
the data, and robustness checks) as well as further numerical results. Section
1 relates to the migration data (Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 in the main text). Section 2
shows the evolution of variables in the model not displayed in Fig. 3 and 4 in
the main text, based on the same experiments. Section 3 discusses the wage
data (Fig. 5 in the main text). Section 4 gives details on the empirical rental
rates for housing (Fig. 6 and 7 in the main text) and provides a number of
additional Figures. They are based on different methods to check robustness.
Moreover, they look at the evolution of rental rates of housing according to
city size.
∗Corresponding author: University of Fribourg; CESifo, Munich; Institute for the Study of
Labor (IZA), Bonn; Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration (CReAM), University College
London. Address: University of Fribourg, Department of Economics, Bd. de Pe´rolles 90, 1700
Fribourg, Switzerland. E-mail: volker.grossmann@unifr.ch.
†ETH Zurich; University of Leipzig. Address: ETH Zurich, Zu¨richbergstr. 18, CH-8092 Zurich,
Switzerland. Email: aschaefer@ethz.ch.
‡University of Leipzig; CESifo, Munich, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH). Address:
Institute for Theoretical Economics, Grimmaische Strasse 12, 04109 Leipzig, Germany. Email:
steger@wifa.uni-leipzig.de.
§University of Hohenheim. Address: Department of Economics (520B), 70593 Stuttgart, Ger-
many. Email: benjamin.fuchs@uni-hohenheim.de.
1
1 Migration Data
Data sources
• 1991−1994: ‘Wanderungsdatenbank, Leibniz-Institut fu¨r La¨nderkunde’.
• 1995−2014: ‘Wanderungsstatistik - Statistische A¨mter des Bundes und
der La¨nder’, with the following exceptions where the data comes from the
‘Statistische Landesa¨mter’: Brandenburg 1993 and 2014, Mecklenburg-Hither
Pomerania 2014, Saxony 1994, Saxony-Anhalt 2007 and 2014, Thuringia
1991-1993 and 2007-2014.
General remarks
• The migration data set used for Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 in the main text is
based on net migration balances, taking into account all movements crossing
the border of administrative districts. Administrative districts correspond
to NUTS 3 units in the EUROSTAT typology for all five New Laender in
Germany. The districts in the New Laender were subject to numerous border
reforms between 1991 and 2014, reducing their number considerably. In order
to be able to compare the data over a period from 1991 to 2014, one territorial
status was chosen and reconstructed for the periods with differing district-
borders. The longest period not marked by big territorial reforms lasted from
1995 to 2006. Thus, we selected the territorial boundaries valid at that time.
For the periods before (1991-1994) and after (2007-2014), the municipalities
(corresponding to LAU2 units) were assigned to the districts to whom they
belonged during the referential period and their net migration balances were
added up to reconstruct the data at the district-level.
• Two former districts of Saxony-Anhalt are not included in the analysis:
Anhalt-Zerbst and Dessau. During the reforms of the districts’ borders in
2007 the urban municipality Dessau was merged with the urban municipality
Roßlau. Unfortunately, there is no data available distinguishing between the
former Dessau and the former Roßlau. It is therefore not possible to recon-
struct the district of Dessau for the time before 1995 and after 2013. In the
course of the reform, several municipalities from the newly formed district of
Dessau-Roßlau were attributed to Anhalt-Zerbst, rendering it impossible to
reconstruct this district as well. The municipalities which belonged to these
two districts are therefore not shown in the data.
2 Complementing Numerical Results
In this section we display the evolution of other variables not displayed in Fig. 3
and Fig. 4 in the main text, for the same experiments.
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Figure A.1: Transitional dynamics for an initially capital-poor assuming labor mar-
ket integration at t=0 (solid lines) and assuming that labor markets remain closed
(dotted lines). Same parameter configuration as for Fig. 3 in the main text.
Figure A.2: Transitional dynamics for an economy that initially is capital-poor and
has low TFP levels assuming labor market integration at t=0 (solid lines) and assum-
ing that labor markets remain closed (dotted lines). Same parameter configuration
as for Fig. 4 in the main text.
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3 Wage Data
Data source: “Entstehung, Verteilung und Verwendung des Bruttoinlandsprodukts
in den La¨ndern der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 1991 bis 2015”, VGRdL. Available
on: http://www.vgrdl.de/VGRdL/tbls/
General remarks
• The real wage time series employed in Fig. 5 in the main text is based on
gross wages (i.e. earnings before taxes, social contributions and payments in
kind), nominal and real private household consumption and a consumption
deflator.
• The consumption deflator was calculated from nominal private household con-
sumption and real private household consumption. Real household consump-
tion is derived from nominal private household consumption and a chain index.
The current base year of the chain index is 2010. Nominal and real private
household consumption is measured in million Euros.
• Gross wages are measured per employee, including civil servants, interns and
trainees as well as part-time work in the main occupation.
• Fig. A.1 shows the evolution of real wages (in 2010 prices) in the five New
Laender separately and for East Germany as a whole (without Berlin). There
is a large increase in the 1990s that led to the (incomplete) convergence to the
West German wage level shown in Fig. 5. Real wages in the New Laender as
well as in West Germany changed little in the 2000s.
Figure A.3: Real wages per worker (in 2010 EUR) in the New Laender, 1991-2014.
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4 Data on Rental Rates of Housing
Data Source: German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) v31. http://dx.
doi.org/10.5684/soep.v311.
General Remarks:
• SOEP is a representative annual household panel survey that offers detailed
information on rental housing from the perspective of tenants. Because of
the panel structure of the data, we are able to control for time-invariant con-
founders at the tenancy level. The final data set consists of 107,514 private
households who live in rental apartments between 1984 and 2014 in West Ger-
many and 34,248 private households who live in rental apartments between
1990 and 2014 in East Germany.
• To get robust estimations, we exclude the upper and the lower 1% of the un-
conditional rent and apartment size distribution. The final analysis is therefore
restricted to apartments which cost more than 28 deflated EUR and less than
1520 deflated EUR and to apartments not smaller than 26 sqm and not larger
than 159 sqm.
• In addition to presenting descriptive evidence, we constructed price measures
based on standard hedonic pricing models. The basic idea is to construct a
quality-adjusted measure of rental payments. Details of two different (but
related) methods are given below.
• Tab. A.1 describes the variables used to construct the empirical measures for
the rental rates of housing. For categorical variables the reference category is
printed in bold and excluded from the regression analyses.
• For each quality measure with missing values, except size, we replace missing
values by zero and include an additional dummy variable coded one if the value
of the original variable is imputed (and zero otherwise). Results presented
under the label “Sample Without Covariate Missings” exclude observations
with missings in apartment characteristics.
• Results presented under the label “Sample Without One-Obs. Tenancies” ex-
clude tenancies with only one observation and control for tenancy fixed effects
in the hedonic pricing model. Using tenancy fixed effects addresses the possi-
blity that unobserved and time-constant covariates are correlated with quality
measures. In this case OLS estimators would be biased leading to residuals
which are not correctly calculated. By including rental unit fixed effects, we
are able to control for these unobserved time-invariant confounders. We im-
plement the tenancy fixed effects by calculating mean values of each variable
1For background information on SOEP, see Wagner, Gert G., Joachim R. Frick, and Ju¨rgen
Schupp (2007). The German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP): Scope, Evolution and En-
hancements, Schmollers Jahrbuch - Journal of Contextual Economics 127, 139-169.
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in the hedonic pricing model for each rental unit and calculate for each obser-
vation the difference between the values of the original variables and the mean
values for each rental unit. Instead of the original variables, we then use these
demeaned variables.
• We present three sets of results for the evolution of rental rates for housing
over time, distinguished by their level of aggregation to regional units.
– West Germany vs. East Germany; see Tab. A.2 for sample sizes per year.
– The five New Laender in East Germany plus Berlin East; see Tab. A.3
for sample sizes per year.
– Cities according to four categories of population size: < 20,000 in-
habitants (< 20K), 20,000-100,000 inhabitants (20K to 100K), 100,000-
500,000 inhabitants (100K to 500K), > 500,000 inhabitants (> 500K);
see Tab. A.4 for sample sizes per year.
• Fig. 6 in the main text shows the rental rate of housing for the full sample
without controlling for quality indicators of the appartment (i.e. Fig. 6 is
purely descriptive).
• Fig. 7 in the main text shows the quality-adjusted rents for the New Laender
based on method 1 including rental unit fixed effects (“Sample Without One-
Obs. Tenancies”, i.e. tenancies with only one observation are excluded).
• Qualitatively, all results on the evolution of rental payments in East German
regional units suggest the same pattern. Rental payments were gradually
increasing in the 1990s and were quite stagnant thereafter.
4.1 Method 1: Residuals as Quality-Adjusted Rents
Using apartment characteristics measuring the quality of an apartment in the he-
donic regression as covariates and rental payment as dependent variable, the error
term is the part of rental payment that cannot be explained by the observable quality
measures and can therefore be interpreted as quality-adjusted rent.
Method 1 of constructing a quality-adjusted rental rate of housing accordingly em-
ploys a two-step procedure. In a first step we specify and estimate the hedonic
pricing model of rental unit i in year t by
(1) yit = β0 +
k∑
j=1
βj · xjit + ηi + uit
where yit denotes the dependent variable, xjit are measures of apartment quality
(see Tab A.1) that are indexed by j = 1, . . . , k, ηi is the fixed effect for rental unit
i, and uit is the residual. As dependent variables we use the rental payment as well
as the rental payment per square meter both in logs and not in logs, i.e. we have
four different dependent variables.
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In a second step we use the estimated residuals of equation (1), uˆit, to calculate
annual averages for varying definitions of regional units by
(2) pHt,R ≡
1
nt,R
nt,R∑
i=1
uˆit · 1 (i ∈ SR)
where (repeating the notation from the main text) nt,R is the number of observations
(apartments) in region R in year t, SR denotes the set of observations in region R,
and 1(i ∈ SR) is a dummy variable that equals one if rental unit i is located in
region R.
4.2 Method 2: Fully Specified Regression Model
Instead of calculating annual averages of quality-adjusted rents in two steps, in
method 2, we add interactions between regional and annual dummies as additional
covariates. The hedonic pricing model then reads as:
(3) yit =
k∑
j=1
βj · xjit +
N∑
R=1
T∑
t=1
γt,R · 1 (i ∈ SR) · 1 (i ∈ St) + ηi + uit,
where St denotes the set of observations in period t and 1(i ∈ St) is a dummy
variable that equals one if rental unit i is observed in period t. The coefficients of
the interaction terms, γt,R, with estimated values denoted by γˆt,R, can be interpreted
as the mean quality-adjusted price measure in region R = 1, ..., N and period t =
1, ..., T . That is, we report price measures
(4) pHt,R ≡ γˆt,R.
As for method 1, we distinguish estimates with and without covariate missing as
well as with and without fixed effects, ηi. Results are quite similar as for method 1.
4.3 Sample Size and Results
4.3.1 Regional Unit: East and West Germany
Table A.1: Sample Size per Year
West Germany East Germany
Survey Year Full W/o
One-Obs.
Tenancies
W/o
Covariate
Missings
Full W/o
One-Obs.
Tenancies
W/o
Covariate
Missings
1984 3624 2863 0 0 0 0
<continued on next page>
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Table A.1: Sample Size per Year <continued>
West Germany East Germany
Survey Year Full W/o
One-Obs.
Tenancies
W/o
Covariate
Missings
Full W/o
One-Obs.
Tenancies
W/o
Covariate
Missings
1985 3199 3101 0 0 0 0
1986 2992 2895 2677 0 0 0
1987 2946 2842 2596 0 0 0
1988 2797 2725 2474 0 0 0
1989 2726 2669 2390 0 0 0
1990 2656 2600 2286 606 508 5
1991 2669 2595 2373 497 475 33
1992 2692 2608 2366 1286 1187 93
1993 2693 2617 2362 1246 1223 79
1994 2652 2564 2330 1218 1195 157
1995 2833 2695 2421 1182 1152 347
1996 2755 2655 2453 1172 1133 431
1997 2669 2560 2356 1144 1101 490
1998 3014 2770 2828 1196 1135 1101
1999 2826 2710 2687 1162 1119 1089
2000 4795 4075 4511 1787 1559 1681
2001 4297 4115 4049 1624 1574 1531
2002 4182 3968 3904 1605 1539 1506
2003 3996 3825 3200 1572 1518 1296
2004 3891 3712 2806 1524 1480 1176
2005 3780 3581 2619 1468 1421 1121
2006 4083 3759 2790 1587 1503 1180
2007 3775 3591 2954 1492 1445 1228
2008 3483 3344 3193 1429 1383 1329
2009 3235 3085 2951 1351 1313 1261
2010 2969 2860 2690 1245 1212 1163
2011 3956 3480 3609 1577 1469 1465
2012 3989 3713 3654 1622 1547 1517
2013 5416 4227 4856 1665 1548 1530
2014 5924 3636 4784 1991 1351 1638
<continued on next page>
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Table A.1: Sample Size per Year <continued>
West Germany East Germany
Survey Year Full W/o
One-Obs.
Tenancies
W/o
Covariate
Missings
Full W/o
One-Obs.
Tenancies
W/o
Covariate
Missings
Total 107514 98440 87169 34248 32090 24447
Note: The column labeled ”Full” refers to the full sample. The columns labeled ”W/o One-Obs.Tenancies”
and ”W/o Covariate Missings” refer to the samples without tenancies with only one observation and without
covariate missings, respectively. Source: SOEP V31 and authors’ calculations.
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